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Abstract
Critical infrastructures often lack resilience and easily lose critical functionalities if hit by adverse events.
Continuity management strategies for critical infrastructure operators and the networks that they form, rely also
on the functionality of other interrelated networks. Disruptions in operations may affect society and for this
reason, securing the operations of critical infrastructure operators is important. The technological impacts of
CPS become evident to the resilience of all fields of critical infrastructure, but there is also human elements to
take into account. The research question of this study is: How to enhance business continuity of critical
infrastructure? This case study research uses qualitative methods collected by conducting interviews of
resilience and continuity professionals who work with Finnish critical infrastructure. Resilience and continuity
management are key for critical infrastructure operators. Important factors identified were identifying risks,
critical activities, key personnel, creating guidelines and procedures, and open communication, which themes
were recognised as important to improve resilience and manage continuity.
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1. Introduction
Critical infrastructures (e.g. transportation, communications, finance, energy, food and water supply) of society
may lack resilience (Ruoslahti, Rajamäki & Koski, 2019), and easily lose critical functionalities when hit by an
adverse event (Linkov et al., 2014). One practical example of an adverse event is the ransomware attack on the
city of Baltimore that disrupted its critical services for weeks. City officials were forced to implement manual
procedures to handle critical functions, e.g. real estate transactions, utility payments, property taxes. Baltimore
spent more than $18 million on its recovery efforts (Fortinet, 2019).
Continuity management strategies for critical infrastructure operators and their networks, may rely on the
functionality of other interrelated networks, and these can be considered being part of a system constituting of
systems – a system of systems. Thus, resilience and continuity can be enhanced by the study and improvement
of interconnectivity between these relevant networks (Linkov et al., 2014). Enhancing the social networks that
surround an organization can also be seen as an important component of societal resilience (O’Rourke, 2007).
While risks in collaboration among networks can be reduced, they cannot be avoided. Thus, organizational
resilience provides tools and conditions to mitigate crises by understanding and reducing risks (Vos, 2017), and
resilience and continuity build on situational intelligence (Pirinen, 2017).
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Continuity of operations become enhanced, when different actors, such as authorities, have interoperability and
capability to supplement and, when needed fill in for each other (Tikanmäki & Ruoslahti, 2017; Ruoslahti &
Hyttinen, 2016). Co-creation results from complex interactions and it may result in resource integration among
the many network actors (Pinho, et al., 2014), while also non-hierarchical interaction helps solve a common
problem with other stakeholders (Roloff, 2008). Network operations benefit from a common aim (Ruoslahti,
2017), but network actors also need to be aware of having different interests (Vos, 2018).
The research question of this study is: How to enhance business continuity of critical infrastructure?
2. Resilience and Business Continuity
Service disruptions and cyber-attacks against essential systems and networks are on the rise (Pahi, Leitner and
Skopik, 2017). Disruptions in operations may affect society as a whole, and for this reason securing the
operations of critical infrastructure operators, public or private, may be crucial for a functioning society
(Ruoslahti, Rajamäki & Koski, 2018). The Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive of the European
Union (EU) (European Commission, 2016) strongly calls for Public Private Partnership (PPP), collaboration
between authorities and the private sector, in the critical field of cyber security. Continuity of operations can be
enhanced with collaboration between the different actors (e.g. authorities and industry), and having
interoperability and capabilities to supplement and even fill in for each other (Tikanmäki & Ruoslahti, 2017;
Ruoslahti & Hyttinen, 2016).
Complex interactions, and even resource integration to enhance resilience and continuity among the many
network actors may ultimately result in co-creation (Pinho, et al., 2014), where common aims (Ruoslahti, 2018),
and non-hierarchical interaction with other stakeholders also help solve common problems (Roloff, 2008). Vos
(2017) proposes that risks in co-creation and collaboration networks can be reduced, but not totally avoided, and
that organizational resilience provides tools and conditions to understand and reduce risks, and to mitigate crises.
Resilience thus, requires collaboration by and between social networks, where communication becomes co-
constructed through the various interactions between the multiple stakeholders, who participate in it. Network
stakeholders may very likely have different interests and various other interdependencies to contend with (Vos,
2017). Co-creation requires interaction among various actors who need knowledge creation processes to build
resilience in their networks, while also guiding connected stakeholder networks to do the likewise (Gustafsson,
Kristensson and Witell, 2012). The roles, engagement, and responsibility of these actors, their mutual
interactions, and impacts become key factors in network collaboration, while situational intelligence is also
needed when building resilience (Pirinen, 2017).
Many of today’s systems include complex interconnections and linear and non-linear relationships between
multiple subsystems, which are both social and technical. Systems that combine both social and technical
elements are considered sociotechnical systems (Singapore-ETH Centre, 2015), or cyber-physical systems
(CPS), demonstrating seamless integration between computational, human and physical elements. These are
subsets of sociotechnical systems (Broy & Geisberger, 2011). According to Murakami (2012) cyber-physical
systems include inputs and outputs between cyber, physical, and social worlds, where computational elements
interact with technical, ecological elements, organisational, and human elements, by using cyber networks and
the Internet, and by the design of and to the benefit of society CPS are rapidly transforming the ways in which
we interact with the physical world. Thus, the technological impacts of CPS become evident to the resilience of
all fields of critical infrastructure; e.g. engineering resilience (Levenson et al., 2006), disaster management
(Dahlberg, et al., 2015) and healthcare (Rajamäki & Pirinen, 2017). Many critical infrastructures of our society
may thus, lose their critical functionalities when hit by adverse events (Linkov et al., 2014). Amir and Kant
(2018) note that sociotechnical systems are intentional hybrids of people and technologies. They involve
complex interactions between people, organizations and technologies, and their complexity complicate their
resilience. According to Ruoslahti, et al. (2018) most CPS are complex and interconnected and for this reason
the experiences and characteristics from multiple sectors of critical infrastructure should be considered
simultaneously.
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The National Academy of Sciences (2012) identify four resilience event management cycles. The first is phase is
Plan, during which plans and preparations to keep services available are made. The second phase Absorb aims to
isolate and maintain the most critical assets, functions and services, while the occurring disruption is being
repelled. The third phase Recover seeks to restore the availability of all services. The final phase Adapt is about
learning from the experiences and modifying resuming operations to be more resilient against future events
(National Research Council, 2012).
Ruoslahti, et al. (2018) find that CPS education should cover all event management cycles (plan or prepare,
absorb, recover, adapt and learn, and self-modify) and resilience domains (physical, information, cognitive and
social). The management strategies for critical infrastructure networks (e.g., telecommunications, electricity, or
transportation) often rely also on the functionality of interrelated networks, which together can be considered
systems of systems. Resilience can thus, be enhanced by the study and improvement of the interconnectivity of
these relevant networks (Linkov et al., 2014), and by enhancing the surrounding social networks, which also are
important for increased societal resilience (O’Rourke & Briggs, 2007). The preparation phase creates a basis for
the ability to absorb and recover from a disruptive incident, after which the adaptation phase creates a feedback
loop that enhances future preparation phases; a cyclical process, as is Business Continuity Planning (BCP)
(Savage, 2002). In addition, other classifications, such as the four domains by the Network-Centric Warfare
(NCW) doctrine (Alberts, 2002) 1) physical, 2) information, 3) cognitive, and 4) social, may help create shared
situational awareness and act as basis for decentralized decision-making. CPS possess both physical elements,
where information is stored and processed to provide a basis for cognitive decisions by the systems users and the
social level its multiple stakeholders.
Open collaboration benefits the aims of all critical infrastructure network stakeholders seeking for resilience.
Open innovation environments, such as the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) and the Finnish
disruption service management network (KRIVAT), are prime examples of CPS frameworks that actively
facilitate interaction between network stakeholders. (Ruoslahti, et al., 2018). On a European level project ECHO
– European network of Cybersecurity centres and competence Hub for innovation and Operations – aims to
establish a coordinated network of cyber security specialists and service providers to, through effective and
efficient multi-sector collaboration, proactively strengthen cyber security in the European Union (Rajamäki,
Tikanmäki & Räsänen, 2019). Pöyhönen et al. (2020) argue that integrating a view of three levels of
organizational decision-making to the five-layer cyber structure by Lehto & Neittaanmäki (2018) a more
comprehensive system view of the cyber security environment of organizations and systems can be gained. In
addition they find that The Observe – Orient – Decide - Act (OODA) loop, can, as a framework, provide
structure to the collaboration aiming to better Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA). The OODA loop is used e.g.
in project ECHO (ECHO, 2019) and other cyber security decision-making (Pöyhönen et al., 2020).
When a threat meets a vulnerability and a capability to cause a consequence, it may be considered a risk (Linkov
et al., 2014). Crisis management aims at organizations to sustain and resume their operations, minimize financial
losses to stakeholders, and learn to better manage future incidents (Pearson & Clair, 1998). The Finnish KRIVAT
concept involves organizations from various sectors of critical services who, when encountering disturbances or
crisis, share information and take needed actions together. Thus, critical infrastructure operators and their
support organizations have a shared system for real-time information exchange between these organizations
when incidents occur.
Ruoslahti (2019) finds that the structure of input, throughput and output communication (Vos & Schoemaker,
2004) is one useful framework to make sense of communication in a networked process of co-creating
knowledge. Forms of input communication may include use cases and scenarios. Throughput communication
concerns the collaborative work among internal and outside stakeholders. Output communication includes
communicating about the aims, work and results to staff, stakeholders and wider audiences.
3. Method
This case study (Yin, 2003) research uses qualitative methods that are collected by conducting interviews and
observing interactions (Denzin and Lincoln 1994). The research by Baskerville and Myers (2009) suggests that
3/1/2021 View of Business Continuity for Critical Infrastructure Operators | Annals of Disaster Risk Sciences
https://ojs.vvg.hr/index.php/adrs/article/view/46/42 4/8
“academic work is usually synchronous with practitioner interests” (p. 648). This research and its research
question (How can business continuity of critical infrastructure be enhanced?) focuses on practitioner interests
using an academic approach. Masters students contributed the practical collection of the sample data, which are
based on 22 interviews of Finnish resilience and continuity professionals, conducted during the spring term of
2018, as part of their studies in Continuity management. In line with the demands of research ethics, each
interviewee was asked for informed consent before the start of each interview.
The cross-case analysis of this data was conducted by the author in late 2019. The analysis is based on first
narrowing the sample to exclude a Data Extraction Table (DET), designed, based on the research question,
specifically for this study. The themes that emerged from the sample data are presented in the Results section
and discussed further in the Conclusions section.
4. Results
According to the interviews resilience and Business Continuity Planning (BCP) is required by law and according
to the national security and cyber-security strategies for large governmental organisations, which have long
traditions in securing their operations against disruptive incidents.
 
Identify Risks
Respondents noted that most important is to identify risks. This should be elaborated by estimating the effects of
disruptions by performing a Business Impact Analysis (BIA) and determine Recovery Time Objective (RTO)
and Recovery Point Objective (RPO). All these serve as basis for the availability of functions and services.
Results indicate that risks can be on two levels: strategic and operative. On a strategic level can be serious
disruptions in power and utilities, IT-infrastructure or serious cyber threats. On an operative level are the risks
related to one’s own processes and especially one’s IT-processes, plus human related risks, such as faulty change
management or risks related to key personnel.
Many disruptions however are technological, such as cyber risks, or those related the physical environment (e.g.
data communications and power and water distribution). In addition, risks that are related to personnel skills
should be taken into account. Some most probable threats against critical infrastructure were mentioned to be
those against their information technology.
One noted problem when operations are being changed or new operations begun, are the unidentified risks.
Resilience was named as a way to prepare for the unexpected. Acute situations call for quick adaptability.
 
Critical Activities
Identifying the critical activities are important in business continuity management and mitigating disruptions.
Different risk management tools can be used when planning for business continuity.
To get over disruptions, day-to-day operations are best built on a strong base. Operations and personnel are
concentrated in existing sites during disruptions. Respondents note that critical functionalities should be
identified, and responsibilities to keep these critical operations determined; focus on core functions.
Exercise is key, and though this may interfere with daily operations, management support and participation are
needed, note respondents, as well as that training and exercise are embedded in organisational culture. Results
indicate that successful security management is best based on identifying risks and a holistic approach to
security.
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One quoted example case stressed the importance of the continuity of IT-operations was a food production
company that receives some 95 % of all its approximately 100.000 daily orders electronically. These orders it




The availability of key resources is key for continuity. Competences for action are important for successful crisis
management. These competences include the ability to collaborate with other employees and stakeholders, and
the ability for situational awareness, which focus on what one can influence and if the problem needs to be
escalated further.
Besides guidelines, training is key for people to be able to perform during crisis situations. Identifying key
personnel is, according to interviewees, one important element, when improving resilience. One way of
improving resilience is that important information is accessible and shared between several people, and not
known by just one person in the organization.
Respondents stressed the availability of skills and competences during disruptions. This was noted as especially
important in relation to IT-systems – these systems need competent users or the situation may even become
worse. Building competence networks ahead of time was noted as one way to prepare for this.
 
Guidelines and Procedures
The results stress the importance of clear roles and responsibilities for encountering different situations, and to
ensure proper procedures. Guidelines and procedures should be tested and practiced before disruptions strike.
Results indicate that successful continuity management should be continuous and systematic. The ISO-standard
PDCA (Plan, Do, Check, Act) –principle was mentioned as one approach that may promote a systematic
approach. Thus, continuity planning calls for updating and testing of procedures and networks in real-time.
Requirements for the IT-systems of critical infrastructure and their cyber security should be made in relation to
the service that it provides, and it was noted that all partners should have the skills and competences to plan and
prepare. Regularity and schedules were also stressed in continuity management, as was leadership. Continuity
management needs to be kept on the agenda.
 
Open Communication
Respondents note that continuity requires human interaction and communication and this calls for regular
contacts and all parties having a willingness to collaborate and solve problems together. Thus, one critical
element of continuity management that the results show is communication. Open communication was seen as a
way to promote resilience, and results also show that it is important to raise awareness toward better
collaboration between the many critical infrastructure actors.
Results show that holistic and collaborative approaches from all value chain and network participants and
engaging people of their organisations can facilitate identifying risks.
According to the respondents, anomalies and disruptions must be observed and efficient counter measures
instigated together with stakeholders. This calls for plans that have been tested through regular exercises. The
choices of which services need to be restored first should be made beforehand to secure needed resources and
critical situations often call for having optional procedures.
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5. Conclusions
Resilience and continuity are key for critical infrastructure operators. Some important factors are a) identifying
risks, b) critical activities, and c) key personnel, as were d) guidelines and procedures, and e) open
communication. These themes (see table 1) were recognised as important, when improving resilience and
managing continuity. Recognising the role of these elements can help the critical infrastructure operators
structure and guide their business continuity planning processes, and focus on co-creative collaboration towards
improved resilience and a more resilient society.
Table 1. Themes important for improving resilience and managing continuity



































































Identifying risks, and many of these are technological, is thus, be seen as a starting point. Then identifying
critical activities and the services that absolutely must first recover becomes key for business continuity
management and mitigating possible disruptions to critical infrastructure.
Exercise, as well as a holistic approach to security, and the availability of key resources, skills and competences
become key for continuity management, while engaging people to clear roles and responsibilities and
collaborative approaches from all stakeholders provide a basis for open communication and co-creation.
The results indicate that the respondents have read their business continuity management and planning literature,
as much of the results seem to support the views gained from literature. Being resilient and prepared was seen
important. Co-creative collaboration and sharing of information was seen important, especially when absorbing
and recovering from possible disruptive incidents. This research thus, contributes to resilience theory and also
has very practical implications for critical infrastructure operators.
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